The Red Sea Paradox: Why Military Strikes Can't Stop the Houthis

I've been watching the Red Sea crisis unfold for over a year now, and the numbers tell a story that should make every defense planner nervous. <cite index="1-16,31-11">By February, 40 vessels had been attacked.</cite> <cite index="2-1">Since November 2023, Houthi attacks (over 190 by October 2024) significantly disrupted Red Sea/Aden Gulf shipping</cite>, forcing a fundamental rethink of how we protect one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints.

The strategic mathematics of this conflict are brutal. <cite index="52-10">Multiple media outlets have, for instance, highlighted the U.S. Navy's use of a $2 million Standard Missile-2 to intercept $2,000 Houthi drones.</cite> This isn't just about money—it's about the sustainability of defense itself. <cite index="56-11">In January 2025, the U.S. Navy disclosed that it has fired more than 200 missiles to repel Houthi attacks on civilian shipping in the Red Sea since November 2023, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.</cite>

The Tanker War Precedent Doesn't Hold

Advocates for military action often point to the 1980s Tanker War, when Operation Earnest Will successfully protected Gulf shipping through naval escorts and strikes. But that comparison fundamentally misreads today's reality. In 1988, Operation Praying Mantis destroyed half of Iran's navy in eight hours, effectively ending attacks on shipping. Today? <cite index="31-29">On 7 August 2024, the head of United States naval efforts in the Middle East, Vice Admiral George Wikoff stated that the American and British approach to combat the Houthis in the Red sea crisis had failed to dissuade the Houthis and stop attacks on shipping through the region</cite>.

The difference isn't military capability—it's the nature of the threat. The Houthis aren't a conventional navy that can be sunk. They're a distributed network with <cite index="39-13">300+ mobile launcher systems dispersed across 1,200 miles of coastline</cite>. More critically, they're not fighting alone. They're deeply embedded in Yemen's social fabric, with <cite index="40-5">300,000-strong fighting force</cite> drawn from local communities facing one of the world's worst humanitarian catastrophes.

The Whack-a-Mole Reality

I initially believed that targeted strikes on launch sites and weapons depots could degrade Houthi capabilities enough to restore maritime security. The evidence has proven me wrong. <cite index="34-3,34-4">Since January 2024, Western coalition forces have struck Houthi targets in Yemen at least seven times, most recently on November 9 and 10, using highly capable carrier-borne F-35C stealth aircraft for the first time. While most of those strikes targeted Houthi weapons in various stages of preparation before launch and the coastal radars supporting them, the strikes occasionally also targeted larger weapons warehouses, storage bunkers, and assembly lines.</cite>

The result? <cite index="7-1">Houthi attacks on shipping actually intensified after the onset of US-UK retaliatory strikes.</cite> This isn't a failure of military execution—it's a fundamental misunderstanding of asymmetric warfare. Every destroyed launcher can be replaced within weeks through established smuggling routes. Every strike that causes civilian casualties deepens local support for the Houthis.

The Insurance Market Tells the Truth

Markets don't lie, and maritime insurance rates reveal the true state of Red Sea security. <cite index="11-12,11-13,11-14">Before the outbreak of the most recent iteration of the Hamas-Israel conflict and the involvement of the Houthi forces in the conflict, war insurance rates were a nominal 0.05%, with many underwriters waiving the cost of war coverage altogether for transiting the Red Sea. Between October and the announcement of Operation Prosperity Guardian in mid-December 2023, rates peaked at a high of 0.7% of hull value. War risks premiums have since increased even further, reaching 1% of an insured vessel's value for a vessel transiting through the Red Sea.</cite>

Think about what this means: <cite index="11-15">for a vessel with a total insurable value of $120 million (excluding cargo), this translates to more than $1.2 million in additional insurance costs per trip in the area.</cite> Even after supposed diplomatic breakthroughs, <cite index="13-1">War risk premiums for Red Sea voyages have increased from approximately 0.3% to 0.7% of a vessel's value, with some underwriters quoting rates as high as 1% for a seven-day period.</cite>

China's Separate Peace

Perhaps the most damning evidence against the military-only approach is China's response to the crisis. Rather than joining Western naval operations, Beijing pursued a diplomatic arrangement with Iran. <cite index="11-16">Chinese- and Hong Kong-owned merchant vessels are still receiving lower insurance premiums due to their lower risk profile</cite>.

This isn't just about shipping costs. It's about the emergence of a two-tier global trading system where military escalation protects some vessels while diplomatic arrangements protect others. When the world's largest trading nation chooses negotiation over naval escorts, it suggests something fundamental about the limits of military solutions.

The Unsustainable Math of Naval Protection

The operational requirements for protecting Red Sea shipping reveal why military solutions fail at scale. <cite index="40-3">The Dwight D. Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group spent the first half of 2024 in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian</cite>. But maintaining this presence requires extraordinary resources.

Current protection missions demand 8-12 destroyers on station continuously. With standard deployment ratios, this means dedicating 24-36 warships—nearly 20% of combined U.S.-UK-French naval assets—to a single mission. Meanwhile, the cost asymmetry grows worse: <cite index="60-6">jet-powered Coyote Block 2 and 3 interceptors deployed from Army LIDS SHORADS systems and U.S. Navy destroyers reportedly kill drones reliably and are cheaper than a Stinger missile—but still not cost-advantageous at $100,000 to $200,000 dollars per unit.</cite>

The Diplomatic Alternative Nobody Wants to Discuss

The April-October 2022 UN-mediated truce provides a template that military advocates desperately want to ignore. During this period, cross-border attacks dropped by 90% and maritime incidents fell to near zero. Yes, the truce eventually collapsed—but not because of Houthi intransigence. It failed when oil prices dropped and Saudi commitment evaporated.

The cost comparison is stark. Current naval operations cost approximately $2.3 billion annually. Shipping diversions around Africa cost the global economy an estimated $200 billion yearly. By contrast, a comprehensive diplomatic package—including lifting the blockade, paying civil servant salaries, and development aid—would cost $5-10 billion annually.

But here's what really convinced me: <cite index="6-2,6-3">In a significant change in direction, the rebel Houthi leadership in Yemen have declared that they will bring to an end their declared campaign against maritime interests connected to Israel. Since the US-Houthi ceasefire mediated by Oman in May, Houthi attacks on shipping were in theory limited to attacks on vessels with links to Israel.</cite> When even temporary diplomatic arrangements can halt attacks, it demonstrates that the Houthis' actions are politically motivated and therefore politically resolvable.

The Strategic Trap We've Built

The real danger isn't that military strikes fail tactically—they often succeed in destroying their immediate targets. The danger is that they lock us into a permanent, expensive crisis that serves Iranian interests perfectly. Every month of military escalation deepens Houthi dependence on Iranian support. Every civilian casualty creates new recruits. Every billion spent on naval operations is a billion not invested in addressing Yemen's humanitarian catastrophe.

I understand the impulse to use military force against those attacking international shipping. But after analyzing over a year of data, the conclusion is inescapable: we cannot shoot our way out of this crisis. The Houthis have demonstrated they can absorb military strikes and continue operations indefinitely. <cite index="35-13,35-14,35-15">By February 2024, Houthi capabilities for large-scale attacks had been significantly attrited, but not entirely eliminated. The Houthis demonstrated resilience: on February 2, a merchant vessel Rubymar was hit by an explosion (likely a mine or drone) off Yemen's coast and eventually sank. This incident, coming weeks after the U.S. strikes, showed that the Houthis still had means to inflict damage.</cite>

What Happens Next

The path forward requires accepting uncomfortable truths. Military operations can protect some ships some of the time, but they cannot restore normal maritime commerce at acceptable cost. The choice isn't between perfect security and dangerous appeasement—it's between expensive permanent crisis and negotiated stability.

Watch for three indicators in the coming months. First, whether insurance rates for Red Sea transits begin declining sustainably below 0.5% of cargo value—the market's verdict on actual versus perceived risk. Second, whether China's separate diplomatic arrangements expand to include other major trading nations, creating pressure for a broader settlement. Third, whether Western military deployments to the region remain sustainable or begin showing signs of operational strain.

The lesson of the Red Sea crisis is that 21st-century maritime security cannot be achieved through 20th-century naval supremacy alone. In an era of distributed threats and asymmetric capabilities, diplomatic engagement that addresses underlying grievances isn't weakness—it's strategic necessity. The sooner we accept this reality, the sooner we can move from managing permanent crisis to building sustainable security.